weapons have landed on the United States. Radio communications have been cut, and they are receiving no messages. They assume the worst.

In these circumstances, Captain Bush told a British TV program, the captain might tell his crew: "Men, our wives and children have been killed. Washington has been destroyed. Our responsibility is to retaliate. Let's go. And they would go."

But Washington might not have been destroyed. It is very likely that the governments involved would have been trying desperately to halt the nuclear exchange; they might have succeeded. Cut off from the outside world, the submarine's commander would have no way of knowing.

Radio communications with surface ships are less vulnerable to disruption than communications with submarines. So there is less justification for not having PALs on the nuclear weapons that many surface ships carry, including the Tomahawk cruise missiles. Yet the danger in the case of a nuclear-armed surface ship is not what its captain may decide in remote isolation, as in a submarine, but what he may decide in the heat of battle.

The surface ships that carry nuclear missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges, unlike missile-carrying submarines on their deterrent mission, might engage in a conventional conflict at sea. A captain who faces the destruction of his ship, and believes that it can be saved by resorting to nuclear weapons, will be under pressure to defy orders and use them. True, a captain can't do this alone; officers junior to him are instructed to refuse to obey an order to use nuclear weapons unless they can confirm independently that authorization has been received. But it goes against a Navy man's training to refuse to obey an order from his commanding officer.

When McNamara first ordered the installation of PALs on land-based nuclear warheads, he faced stiff resistance from the military. Neither the Army nor the Air Force liked the idea of being responsible for weapons that they didn't ultimately control. The Navy today is no different. But ultimately, the same argument that overcame resistance to PALs on land-based weapons applies to sea-based weapons as well. Nuclear weapons must not be used without authorization from the highest authority. That rule is absolute. Devising a PAL that overcomes the difficulty of communicating with submarines won't be easy. The steadily increasing number of warheads on the water makes it all the more necessary. Even if the odds seem heavily against the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons at sea, what took place in the control room of the USS *Vincennes* on July 3 is a reminder that accidents can, and do, happen.

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Reagan's botched spy buildup.

MISSION INVISIBLE

BY GREGORY FOSSEDAL AND ANGELO CODEVILLA

> At a time of increasing danger, the U.S. intelligence community has lost much of its ability to supply the president, senior officials, and the Congress with accurate and timely analyses. . . . The United States must have the best intelligence capability in the world. Republicans pledge this for the United States.
>
> —Republican Party Platform, 1980

Promises, promises. Ronald Reagan attempted to deliver on them by increasing the budget for intelligence by much more than the budget for defense, by appointing the very bright Bill Casey as director of Central Intelligence, and by elevating his job to Cabinet rank. But rather than "rebuilding" America's intelligence capabilities, the Reagan administration has presided since 1980 over a string of intelligence failures, snafus, and downright disasters that makes even Jimmy Carter's record look good. Scratch one of the administration's foreign policy blunders and you'll find an intelligence failure.

Poland: In 1982 CIA Director William Casey bragged to a number of journalists that his operatives had discovered the Soviet plans for imposing martial law in Poland months before their 1981 execution. Now-defected Colonel Kuklinski, a key U.S. mole inside the Polish general staff, had transmitted the plans to incredulous U.S. officials in August 1981, pleading with them to take action. But the CIA personnel in charge of Eastern Europe believed they were phony—intended to lure the United States into premature action. Casey reportedly told the House intelligence committee in the fall of 1981, "There are no signs of a crackdown, and many signs pointing in the opposite direction."

Lebanon: Where were our agents? Where else but the

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embassy. Drawing on their limited reach, no less than Secretary of State George Shultz assured Reagan that a passive U.S. peacekeeping force could assure the survival of Lebanese president Gemayel and restore order to the country. Wrong on both counts. The lack of U.S. agents in the terrorist world made us vulnerable to the bombings that chased the United States first out of the embassy and then out of the country altogether.

Iranamok: Whether or not Ollie North was a patriot or villain in seeking to aid the Nicaraguan *contras*, the genesis of the scandal was in the Middle East. A near-total American dependence on foreign intelligence services led the United States first to sell arms to some of the most anti-American operatives in Iran, then to continue the sale unskeptically for more than a year.

Walker: Between 1967 and 1985 John Walker sold the Soviet Union our main code-making programs, along with countless other naval secrets. That the Soviets managed to locate a mole like Walker is, actually, not that astounding. What's frightening is that no one ever noticed that the Soviets were wiser than they should have been, and hence, no one tried to trace their knowledge back to its source. Only when Walker's wife turned him in did it occur to smug Navy and intelligence officials that such a mole might exist.

Panama: It's hard to know what's worse—if George Bush, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, and others are concealing things they knew about the drug activities of Manuel Noriega, or if they actually were as ill-informed as they are now claiming. U.S. intelligence, led by the CIA, persistently misled administration and congressional officials about the internal situation. Early projections had it that Noriega would be toppled in a few days: he wasn't. U.S. sanctions, according to intelligence reports, would rapidly cripple the regime: they didn't.

The United States' recent losses in the game of spy vs. spy don't depend on any comparison with inflated Soviet achievements. What's important is not whether the United States is somehow "behind the Soviets" in some index of intelligence (though we probably are). The real question is, are there things we need or would like to know, but don't know? Measured by this prudent standard, U.S. intelligence suffers glaring weaknesses. Daniel O. Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and deputy director of the CIA, and onetime Reagan adviser, says that "our intelligence in terms of taking lots of pictures and cranking out estimates is a lot better than ten years ago. Our intelligence in terms of knowing what we need to know is marginally worse—and it was pretty bad in the 1970s."

TO UNDERSTAND why the Reagan buildup failed, start with William Casey. Casey's brilliance was tempered by his awe of the agency, and by a focus on political action that crowded out the multibillion-dollar issues like what makes a good spy satellite. Casey knew a lot about classical espionage. He had been a spy-master in World War II. Even before taking office in 1981, he had intended to increase the diversity of the CIA's clandestine services by recruiting businessmen, and by adding part-timers to the service's corps of homogeneous bureaucrats. That's why he appointed Max Hugel, former president of Brother International Corporation, to head the service. The ensuing uproar from the clandestine career officers and their many friends in Washington focused on Hugel's business ethics. But what they really wanted was to frustrate any change in the service's operations. They succeeded. Having been nearly driven from office himself, Casey replaced Hugel with John Stein, who had served as the service's deputy chief during the Carter administration, and who deeply believed in the status quo.

It was always difficult to focus Casey's attention on technical—mostly satellite—intelligence collection. Most bureaucrats at the CIA and NSA were content to modernize the KH-11, America's main spy satellite. The KH-11 was developed at a time when U.S. leaders believed that arms control would limit the Soviet Union to building only single-warhead missiles launched from fixed silos or submarine tubes. Unfortunately, while missile technology and strategy has changed since then, the approach to reconnaissance has not. When the Pentagon argued for new technology, it met stiff resistance from the entrenched intelligence bureaucracy. Casey never could get excited about machines. So he punted, signed the budget requests that were put before him, and the bureaucracy committed the bulk of the U.S. intelligence budget into the mid-1990s to technical approaches conceived in the 1960s and 1970s.

CASEY WAS more concerned with counterintelligence. Unlike most of his generation, he was able to conceive that spy satellites could be fooled, and thought that the agencies ought to have programs to try to find out how the Soviets were using the copious knowledge that they had gained about our machines from Walker and other turncoats. He also had a lively sense of the ever present possibility of double agents. Moreover, there had been strong and growing bipartisan support in Congress for such counterintelligence measures as increased analysis, more FBI special agents, and fewer Soviets in the United States. Congress also directed the community to assess how specific losses of secrecy could benefit the Soviets.

The bureaucracy objected violently to all this: to question the security of satellites is to question the worth of a multibillion-dollar program as well as the importance of many people and careers. Casey never wavered from asserting the importance of the questions. But as an organization man, he limited himself to persuasion, and those willing to be persuaded were few.

Casey was a policy-maker at heart who cared about the usefulness of the reports that the intelligence community turned in to the president and Cabinet. He and his chief analyst (and later, chief deputy, Robert Gates) made sure that reports were shorter, more timely, and relevant to U.S. policy. In 1982, in the most remarkable speech ever given to CIA analysts, Gates pointed out that their record on big questions had been bad, that henceforth track records of analysts' judgments would be kept and used by promotion

boards. The point, according to Gates, was to encourage analysts to pay more attention to the real world than to the demands of the agency's own subculture. Yet neither Casey nor Gates dared to do the things that would really have exposed that subculture to the winds of competition, namely to institute competitive teams of analysts and to authorize the Defense Intelligence Agency to issue "all source" intelligence reports that were given as much weight as those issued by the CIA.

In the end, Casey left American intelligence in the hands of those who had seized control of it in the revolution of the 1970s. But the events of the 1980s left their mark on those outsiders in Congress, the NSC, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board who have had the job of intelligence oversight.

Even Congress, which got into the business of oversight with the sole idea of protecting the country against an excess of intelligence capacity, has become convinced that the problem lies rather in forcing a hidebound bureaucracy to keep up with a changing world. During the mid-'80s, the critiques and suggestions emanating from Congress, the PFIAB, and the NSC had much in common. But the bureaucratic center prevailed because its ultimate boss, President Ronald Reagan, was an even more uncritical fan than Casey. The most notable example of Reagan's relationship with intelligence occurred in 1982. After arguments and counterarguments in the NSC, the president signed a directive on counterintelligence. A year later his staff informed him that the intelligence community had willfully disregarded it. Whereupon the president declined to take further action. The PFIAB, too, found in 1986 that no matter how strong its case that current technical collection systems were yielding diminishing returns, the president would not force the bureaucracy to do what it did not want to do.

THE GOOD NEWS is that an intellectual consensus for reform is emerging among many intelligence officials and observers. The reforms called for by the PFIAB, Congress, and the NSC can be implemented with equal vigor by liberals or conservatives. All implementation requires is the willingness to compare what U.S. intelligence must do to what it can do.

1. Recruit socially diverse, language-qualified officers who are also experts in a field, such as economics, area studies, or military technology. One unpublished CIA estimate shows that most agents now have no particular expertise in a field such as physics, chemistry—or even a particular field of culture, history, or the social sciences—that might be useful or essential. And a recent study of the CIA's Mexico City agents for the PFIAB found that only a handful spoke Spanish—a relatively common language—at a 3-rating level of competence or better on the State Department's 5-point scale.

2. Then send them abroad in ways that allow them to pose as citizens of third countries, or at least as something other than U.S. government employees. Our CIA, according to a 1981 report that still holds today, makes less use of agents recruited abroad than nearly any other major intelligence service, including those of Britain, France, and Israel. The vast majority of our spies, as in Lebanon, operate under thin and predictable cover as embassy officials. By the agency's own rules, only a limited percentage of officials at a given embassy may be U.S. agents. The United States receives disproportionately great returns from the minuscule number of businessmen and scientists it employs as part-time intelligence officers, and from the very few who live under "unofficial" cover. It receives disproportionately small returns from the small army of thinly covered career bureaucrats. We need spy-masters who can go safely where Americans stand out like sore thumbs or are not welcome.

3. Put more eyes in the skies. We could orbit many cheap, low-resolution satellites, with multidisciplinary sensors, to blanket the Soviet Union and keep track of mobile missiles. Instead of orbiting a few, well-known electronic "vacuum cleaners" to scoop up and sort a diminishing number of nuggets out of the increasing volume of electronic junk on the world's airwaves, we should use unorthodox technical means to place electronic ears in well-chosen places. We get immeasurably more on the very few occasions when a camera or an antenna is somewhere the Soviets don't expect it to be than during the years of "normal" operations that the Soviets have come to expect.

4. Institutionalize skepticism. There is no alternative to establishing career counterintelligence services within each of our intelligence agencies. These services should be filled with analysts rather than with gumshoes. Their primary job must be to question the security of our own intelligence operations. To expect a government employee to criticize fairly the judgment of others is realistic only if his own career is not subject to those whom he criticizes. Moreover, since the task of counterintelligence transcends the individual agencies, there must be a set of central files where people cross-trained in espionage and satellite collection can look over the whole gamut of intelligence data to spot clues to disasters like the Walker ring.

5. Competition. The recipe for better analysis can be reduced to this one word. Analysis would improve significantly by cutting down on intellectual incest. Moreover, too many intelligence reports deal with matters that involve little if any secret information. The CIA must avoid subjects like population trends in Ruritania, on which there is plenty of public information, and report hard data on hard questions, such as the Soviet ABM system. In such cases, it must go further along the path on which Robert Gates set it, of separating the fragments of fact from the mass of conjecture.

The key to these reforms is for the next president to choose innovation over extrapolation of arrangements that are serving us less and less well. He, his CIA director, and his NSC adviser must look over the intelligence community's shoulder with the intention of keeping its nose to the grindstone. □